Labor relations in communist economies diverged from those in free market economies.
Under communism nearly all workers joined official "transmission belt" unions that operated as an arm of the state rather than as independent representatives of workers. The state set wages, prices, and enterprise budgets in ways that created huge job vacancies with no open unemployment; produced low real wages and narrow skill and sectoral pay differentials; and resulted in inefficient allocations of labor (Freeman,1992) . While most analysts believe that communist labor practices produced demoralized and disgruntled workers, there have been no comparisons of worker attitudes in historically communist economies and market economies using comparable survey instruments that document or test this expectation. i To what extent do workers in traditionally communist societies differ in their attitudes toward work conditions, wage inequality, job satisfaction, the role of unions and the role of the state in determining labor market outcomes from workers in the West? To what extent can any observed differences be attributed to the "legacy" of the communist past, per our title? This paper uses the International Social Science Programme (ISSP) ii surveys for Hungary, supplemented with related survey data for East Germany, Poland, and Slovenia, and ISSP surveys from Western countries to try to answer these questions. Each year the ISSP focuses on a particular topic. The topics most relevant to our area of inquiry are: "social inequality" (1987 module); "work orientation" (1989 module); and "the role of government" (1990) . iii We find sufficient differences in answers relating to these topics between respondents in Hungary and in the other previously communist countries and in several Western countries to suggest that communism left an identifiable common legacy in the labor area.
Characteristics of Eastern European and Western data samples
Most of our data for the formerly communist countries is for Hungary, which has been a regular participant in the ISSP since 1986. The sample size in the survey declines from relatively large numbers at the outset (1747 in 1986 iv and 2606 in 1987) to smaller numbers by the turn of the decade (1000 in 1989 and 977 in 1990) . The Hungarian data are imperfect along several dimensions. Unionization data are not available for 1990 and 1991, and we have no income data for the 1991 survey. Over 90% of respondents are public sector employees, which prevents us from making inferences about developments in the private sector. All of these factors suggest that the ISSP data will understate changes in labor market outcomes and practices as Hungary moved toward a market economy.
The data for the other formerly communist countries are more limited, consisting largely of responses to attitudinal questions, rather than about labor market outcomes. East Germany and Slovenia were included in the 1991 ISSP but their surveys did not obtain data on incomes or unionization. The corresponding 1987 Polish survey contains even less information about the labor market. Still, it is important to examine the responses to attitudinal questions for these countries as well as for Hungary, so that we do not incorrectly infer something about the communist legacy from the distinct features of a single former communist country.
For our comparison group we have data from sixteen ISSP countries as well as from Switzerland in 1987 that gives us just over 93,000 individual responses. Details of the number of responses by country for each year from 1985 is presented in Appendix Table A1. v By comparing the former communist states with a set of Western countries, we avoid the danger that differences between the East European countries and any particular Western country, such as the United States, are due to the distinct characteristics of that Western country rather than to the legacy of communist labor practices vis-a-vis market economies in general.
Unionism
We begin by comparing levels of unionism and attitudes toward unionism across countries. Table 1 shows some of the labor market characteristics of respondents in the four former communist countries for which we have data. By 1989-1991 the rates of unionization in three countries for which we have data are markedly below the 100% unionism that existed under communism, though still relatively high. The unionization figures for Hungary vi show a sharp fall in union membership from 1986 to 1989 with the collapse of communism. We doubt that the ISSP data correctly capture the timing of the trend in unionization, but independent estimates of union membership from Hungarian unions confirm that union density fell as workers no longer feel the compulsion to be members (Freeman, 1994) and in the face of changes in labor laws. In 1989 Hungary passed laws establishing freedom for association along Western lines, as opposed to near compulsory union membership under communism. Independent unions were formed, and the old official unions began to act like real unions, so that by the early 1990s union membership had a different meaning than it did under communist dictatorships. In 1993
Hungary held union elections in which workers could designate the union to represent them on the board responsible for unemployment insurance?. The successors to the old official unions won about 80% of the votes, indicating that they had attained some legitimacy as an independent voice of workers. The difference between effectively compulsory unionism under communism and freely chosen independent unionism suggests an alternative (extreme) reading of the evidence on change: from 0% to 30-40% of genuine unionization. However one interprets this, union membership is moving toward more normal numbers relative to the population in all of the former communist countries.
The ISSP contains several questions about attitudes toward unionism. Table 2 ). Responses to an ISSP question on the need for unions to protect the interests of workers (question 3 in 
Earnings and attitudes toward earnings
The ISSP contains information on the monthly earnings of Hungarians in each year of the survey. We have used these data to estimate log earnings equations for the period after the fall of communism, 1989-90, and for 1986. The results are given in Table 3 Table A2 .
In terms of perceptions of earnings differentials, the data tell a clear story: people in the former communist countries perceive a much narrower wage distribution than those in the West. whereas the difference for the United States is .27 and for Austria .29 . If the scaling hypothesis is correct, it applies to the ex-communist countries and Western countries separately and does not explain why people in the latter favor more egalitarian wage distributions.
Job satisfaction
Questions about job satisfaction are difficult to interpret due to the subjective nature of the variable and problem of making interpersonal comparisons (Freeman, 1978) . Still, the econometric literature based upon satisfaction data has yielded interesting and consistent results across data sets that show links between satisfaction and economic and demographic variables (see, for example, Hamermesh (1977) , Borjas (1979 ), Freeman (1978 , Blanchflower and Oswald (1992) and Clark and Oswald (1992) ). Comparisons of responses to satisfaction questions across countries are fraught with even greater dangers, and we are aware of only studying making satisfaction comparisons across countries (Blanchflower and Oswald (1992) who compare the UK and the US). People in one country may "scale" responses differently than those in another. For instance, Americans may be relatively optimistic, with an "everything will work out" mentality that leads people with the same true satisfaction (on some objective scale) viii to respond more positively to a "Are you satisfied with your job?" question than the potentially more reserved British. Still, the responses of people who lived under communism to questions about job satisfaction offer some clue as to how that system affected their working lives; and enables us to examine, albeit crudely, the widely held view that communist labor relations practices produced less satisfied workers than free market practices, as one would expect from the standard view of communist labor relations and individual reports, for instance in Haraszti (1978).
The only former communist country for which we have job satisfaction data is Hungary, which, along with 10 Western countries, asked a satisfaction question as part of the 1989 ISSP.
The specific question is a general one: "How satisfied are you in your job?". The tabulated distribution of responses for Hungary and the Western countries in table 5 shows that relatively few Hungarians are completely or very satisfied with their job (13%) compared to large proportions of Westerners, ranging from 33% in Eire to 50% in the U.S. At face value, this is striking confirmation for the notion that workers under communism are less happy with their jobs than workers under communism. But there are potential problems with this reading of the evidence. The differences in Table 5 could be due to differences in the composition of work forces across countries associated with job satisfaction. They could be due to entirely to differences in income rather than to labor relations practices. It seems reasonable to expect that higher paid Westerners are more likely to be satisfied with their job than lower paid Hungarians.
Finally, our stress on differences at the upper end of the satisfaction scale could be erroneous, offset by differences in other parts of the distribution of responses, in particular the relatively small proportion of Hungarians who report themselves as dissatisfied.
To check these possibilities, and use the entire distribution of responses to the job satisfaction question to estimate country differences, we have employed an ordered probit model.
Ordered probits are the appropriate statistical procedure where, as in this case, respondents express their preferences in the form of an ordinal ranking ix . The ordered probit is based on the following specification:
where z is a latent (unobserved) indicator of job satisfaction, y is the reported categorical indicator, and e is a random disturbance. Since the scale of z is not observed, we employ the usual probit normalization and set the variance of z to unity. The µ 's are unobserved thresholds to be estimated; different values of y are realized as the latent indicator z crosses these thresholds. The dependent variable is coded 1, 2....J.
Our model includes various demographic variables which are known to influence job satisfaction including gender, age and marital status. We also include a unionism variable which previous studies have found is negatively correlated with satisfaction (Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979) and self-employment which has been found to be positively related to satisfaction (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1993) along with a dummy variable for Hungary. The coefficient on this dummy variable tells us how the entire distribution of job satisfaction differs between Hungarians and Westerners, conditional on the diverse control variables. We estimate two equations: a basic job satisfaction equation and an equation that controls, as best we can, for income, using an ISSP question that asked people whether they viewed their income as high:
"For each of the following statements about your job, please tick one box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies to your job: My income is high." Consistent with lower income in former communist countries, Hungarians were far more likely to disagree with this statement.
Some 70% of Hungarians disagreed or disagreed strongly that their income was high compared to 48% of the British, 27% of Germans, 33% of Italians, 43% of Americans, and comparable fractions of other Westerners.
The results of our ordered probit analysis of job satisfaction are given in Table 6 . What factors might produce a "legacy" of greater job dissatisfaction in Hungary? Table 7 presents some evidence on worker perceptions of workplace conditions that cast light on this question. It shows that Hungarian workers are far less likely to regard their jobs as interesting than Western workers (question 1); are far more likely to see their workplace as involving dangerous conditions than Western workers (question 2); and are far more likely to see their workplace as involving unhealthy conditions (question 3). All of these factors are likely to feed into job satisfaction. In coulmn 3 of Table 6 we include a series of dummy variables to distinguish whether respondents considered their jobs to be "interesting" and/or their work conditions to be "unhealthy" or "dangerous". The inclusion of these variables reduces the size of the coefficient on the Hungary dummy by approximately a quarter, although its significance remains. These factors contribute to the low levels of satisfaction in Hungary, but they are not the whole story.
We interpret the table 6 results in two ways: as confirming the reported lower job satisfaction of Hungarians with evidence about objective features of workplaces; and more strongly, as a legacy of transmission belt unions and absence of a free labor market. Workers in Hungary seemingly lacked "voice" or sufficient influence through "exit" under communism to obtain safe and interesting jobs.
If our interpretation of the satisfaction data as reflecting a legacy of communism is valid, we would expect similar patterns of response to satisfaction questions in other previously communist countries. We have not been able to find such survey data. However, the 1991 ISSP provides data on perceived overall "happiness" for Slovenia and East Germany, as well as for Hungary and Western countries.
x At the minimum, we would expect citizens in those countries, as in Hungary, to be less happy than those in the West, and this indeed is what we find. xi Since work is such an important part of life, we infer from that we would obtain a similar pattern for job satisfaction questions.
Role of the state in economic life
Under communism the state dominated economic life, with adverse consequences for economic progress, and worker and citizen satisfaction. By overturning communism, these countries have committed themselves to developing a market economy with a much smaller governmental role in economic affairs than in their past. Still, the decades of government-dominated economic life and communist egalitarian ideology may have left a legacy of "statism" in these countries that would produce different attitudes toward state interventions in wage and employment than is found among people brought up in market economies. 
Conclusion
This study has uncovered substantial differences in the responses to diverse questions about attitudes towards labor market inequality, job satisfaction and happiness, and the role of the state in regulating labor market outcomes between former communist countries and Western countries.
We have interpreted these differences as reflecting a legacy of communist economics, as in our title. The citizens of former communist countries evince a greater desire for egalitarianism than do Westerners, are less satisfied with their jobs, and are more supportive of state interventions. If our interpretation is correct, their move to a market economy will be marked by considerable "social schizophrenia" due to an attitudinal legacy of their communist past. All equations also include 20 region dummies. Dependent variable is the log of monthly earnings including overtime in forint.
Notes: sample restricted to the employed. Notes: weighted data. Numbers do not sum to 100% due to rounding. * = less than 0.5%. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 1) "Actually" Earn
